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ABSTRACT: This article addresses a gap in the literature on nationalism, the case of 
Cornwall. Cornish ethnoregionalism presents a paradox; a minority nationalist 
movement that has sustained itself politically for more than a half a century, culturally 
for more than century, yet one that has achieved little electoral or policy success. It is 
argued here that Cornwall has been conceptualised hitherto too rigidly within one of 
two paradigms – as a Celtic country or as an English county. Instead, recognising this 
hybridity allows us to extend Lieven De Winter’s work on European ethnoregionalist 
parties to explain both the weakness of Cornish ethnoregionalism and its persistence, 
albeit at relatively low levels of activity. By investigating the Cornish case theory on 
ethnoregionalist parties is applied comparatively, leading to the conclusion that 
utilising a number of perspectives at differing scales opens out our understanding of 
concrete cases of minority nationalism. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
More than two decades ago Hechter and Levi pondered why, ‘in an area of Celtic 
nationalism in the British Isles there should be so much of a Welsh problem yet so 
little of a Cornish one’ (Hechter and Levi 1979: 262). However, despite a flowering of 
scholarship on ethnoregional movements, there has been sparse academic discussion 
of the Cornish case since Hechter and Levi wrote these words. This is perhaps 
understandable if we were to accept the view of Gibbon (1993: 64) that, while the 
Welsh and Bretons remain distinct groups ‘others such as the Cornish have 
disappeared’. This neatly solves Hechter and Levi’s dilemma. If there is no such 
identifiable cultural group as the Cornish then there can be no nationalism based on 
that group. But things are not quite so simple. Although Cornwall and Cornish 
nationalism experiences a ‘categorization problem’, occupying diverse and in some 
ways contradictory conceptual spaces, a Cornish nationalist movement exists. This 
movement has contained most of the features commonly associated with European 
minority nationalist movements (Deacon et al 2003). Nevertheless, it has failed to 
achieve either electoral or policy success. This article addresses this paradoxical case 
– a sustained ethnoregional movement which has attained only intermittent visibility. 
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 Through investigating this forgotten case we are able to respond to calls to test 
general theory on nationalism against individual accounts by constructing 
theoretically informed comparative histories (Halliday in Özkirimli 2000: 233). And 
to do this we now possess a far better set of conceptual tools than were available to 
Hechter and Levi. General theories of nationalism, whether ‘primordialist’, 
‘modernist’ or ‘constructivist’, have now attained a sophisticated level (Özkirimli 
2000). But, operating at a relatively abstract level, these offer only modest 
explanatory power if we seek to explain the details of specific ethnoregionalist 
movements (Lecours 2000). In contrast, the detailed body of work on ethoregional 
political parties brought together by De Winter and Tursan (1998) makes use of more 
intermediate variables, focussing on ethnoregional political parties as agents of ethnic 
mobilisation. This adopts an opportunity structure approach, explaining their relative 
success or failure in terms of a capacity to accumulate political resources. 
 
After establishing its relative strength, this article applies De Winter and Tursan’s 
opportunity structure framework to Cornish nationalism, allowing us to establish 
some possible reasons for lack of success. The analysis then broadens out from this 
theoretical base, introducing other perspectives before concluding that, in order to 
understand a specific case of ethnoregionalism, a combination of approaches at 
different scales of explanation are required. Indeed, the narrower the case study the 
more essential it is to provide a wider analytical frame. But first we must explain the 
conceptual confusion that surrounds Cornwall. This article thus begins by identifying 
the ways that Cornwall and Cornish nationalism has been approached by academics. 
 
 
Cornwall and Cornish nationalism 
 
Hechter and Levi assumed that Cornish nationalism was part of a general ‘Celtic 
nationalism’. This is one academic reading of Cornwall - Cornwall as a (Celtic) 
nation. However, there is another - Cornwall as an (English) county. Hitherto, 
Cornwall has tended to be read from one or other of these two perspectives. This 
bifocal perspective helps to explain the bewildering variety of conclusions about this 
regional nationalism. In contrast, the contention here is that the hybridity of 
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Cornwall’s historical experience and its role in producing a case that is neither 
unambiguously Celtic nor just an English county has been under-recognised. Only by 
addressing this hybrid experience explicitly can we reach a better understanding of 
this particular case. 
 
Cornwall’s origins as a British kingdom and the presence of a widely spoken Celtic 
language into the 18th century have brought it to the attention of historians. Echoing 
primordialist views of nationalism there has been some discussion of a distinct 
medieval and early modern ethnicity (Hasting 1997: 44; Robbins 1998: 8-9; Stoyle 
2001). However, the decline of Cornish as a vernacular language is viewed as having 
undermined the ethnic distinctiveness of its people. According to this reading, 
separate ethnicity faded as Cornwall moved into the modern period, a process 
accompanied by Cornwall’s re-branding as an English county. For Hechter, this early 
folding ‘into the expanding Tudor  … state [meant that] no concept of national self-
determination was readily available to help their elites mobilise peasant resistance’. 
Yet minority nationalisms ‘came back to haunt both Britain and France’, being 
adopted in territories like Wales and Brittany (Hechter 2000: 92). Cornwall’s history 
had provided the resources for a similar adoption. 
 
Ward-Perkins (2000: 521) claims that Cornwall ‘remains the one part of England 
where not all indigenous inhabitants automatically describe themselves as “English”’. 
But the word ‘remains’ is misleading. This may not be the lingering reminder of an 
older relict identity. It could be the outcome of an ethnoregional identity renewed in 
recent times. Both Eric Hobsbawm and Tom Nairn raise this possibility. Hobsbawm, 
contrasting Cornwall with the north of England, has remarked that ‘the Cornish are 
fortunate to be able to paint their regional discontents in the attractive colours of 
Celtic tradition, which makes them so much more viable’ (Hobsbawm 1992: 178). 
Meanwhile, according to Nairn, ‘the sole other alternative [to regionalism in England] 
would be the Cornish case – claiming or coining national credentials in order to 
underwrite equal status’ (Nairn 2000: 187). Nairn argues that Cornish nationalism was 
‘simply ignored by traditional all-British political reflection – too insignificant to 
figure, as it were, in its dazzling image of greatness and global reach’ (Nairn 2000: 
14).  
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Cornwall as a (Celtic) nation may have exerted an occasional attraction on historians 
(see also Vernon 1998) but, simultaneously, its administrative status renders its 
nationalist movement indistinct, invisible, even inconvenient, to many social 
scientists. The more common paradigm here is Cornwall as (English) county. Thus 
Alan Butt Philip sees Cornish identity as an example of a ‘local’ identity, ‘typically to 
be found in counties such as Somerset, Cornwall or Durham, which reflect 
administrative (and socio-cultural) divisions which go back 1,000 years (Butt Philip 
1999: 35). The insistence that Cornwall is merely a ‘county’ identity undercuts the 
space available for conceptualising its ethnoregionalist movement. Consequently, the 
actual existence of a political movement calling for devolution, or of an identity that 
might insist on defining itself as more than a county identity, is rarely addressed from 
this perspective. Cornwall becomes an ‘inconvenient periphery’ (Payton 2002) or 
even an embarrassing periphery as claims for the existence of a Cornish national 
identity are vigorously rejected. Thus Crick has written: ‘once I read “Cornish” [in the 
nationality column of a hotel register] but I suspected, correctly, that it was a wag and 
not a nut’ (Crick 1989: 23). Such comforting assumptions indicate that Cornwall 
occupies an intriguing and difficult conceptual space. 
 
References to Cornwall in the footnotes of the literature on nationalism and 
regionalism often owe more to dominant assumptions about territory, place and 
‘Celticity’ than they do to the actual empirical details. In 1951 the organisation 
Mebyon Kernow (MK) (Sons of Cornwall) was formed with a set of cultural demands 
that included furthering the acceptance of the idea of the Cornwall as one of the six 
Celtic nations. From 1951 to the mid-1960s MK remained a small cultural and 
economic pressure group, with attempts to preserve and publicise the Cornish 
language and other Cornish ‘traditions’ uppermost. This began to change in the mid-
1960s when it entered the electoral arena, first fighting local elections and then a 
Parliamentary seat in 1970. By 1979 a relative high point of electoral intervention was 
reached. Reflecting the fortunes of ethnoregionalist parties elsewhere, MK 
experienced a decade of doubts and uncertainty about its direction in the 1980s. Like 
Plaid Cymru it opted for a leftist position in this decade, a trajectory begun during the 
1970s (Lynch 1995; McAllister 2001). In the 1990s electoral activity again increased 
and the party settled down to a less troubled period when it concentrated on 
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electioneering. The transition to a political party was apparently complete (Deacon et 
al 2003). 
 
 
MK in comparative perspective 
 
MK is only part of a wider ‘movement’ that includes a variety of cultural and political 
pressure groups. But, here we concentrate on the support for political 
ethnoregionalism in Cornwall by plotting the electoral performance of MK. Table 1 
compares the results of MK with those of the SNP and Plaid Cymru at parliamentary 
elections, the normal frame of analysis. It is immediately apparent that MK’s 
performance is dismal, the party failing to score more than three per cent even at its 
best election in 1979. It has also never managed to contest all five Cornish 
constituencies. At this level MK is, for all intents and purposes, electorally invisible. 
But there are other levels and other comparisons that can be made. 
 
Table 1: Mean percentage vote of candidates at parliamentary elections  
 MK (number of 
candidates) 
Plaid Cymru SNP 
1970 2.0 (1) 11.5 11.4 
1974 (Feb) 1.5 (1) 10.7 21.9 
1974 (Oct) 0.7 (1) 10.8 30.4 
1979 2.9 (3)  8.1 17.3 
1983 1.2 (2)  7.8 11.8 
1987 no candidates  7.3 14.0 
1992 no candidates  9.0 21.5 
1997 0.8 (4)  9.9 22.1 
2001 2.1 (3) 14.3 20.1 
Source: calculated from Deacon et al 2003; Henig and Baston 2002; Lynch 2002; 
McAllister 2001.  
 
‘Second-order’ elections such as those to the European Parliament are cited as 
opportunities providing a political space for ethnoregionalist parties (De Winter and 
Cachafeiro 2002). Indeed, the first such election was the occasion of one of MK’s 
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most successful results. In 1979, its candidate, Richard Jenkin, won six per cent of the 
vote. But MK fought this election on boundaries that included three non-Cornish 
parliamentary constituencies. Allowing for this, the MK vote equated to 9.5 per cent, 
not that far behind the Plaid Cymru score of 11.7 per cent in Wales. But 1979 was to 
prove a false dawn for Cornish nationalism. In stark contrast to Scotland and Wales, 
at the Euro-elections in both 1989 and 1994 MK’s support reverted to a very low 
level.  
 
Table 2: Mean percentage vote of candidates at European elections 
 MK (adjusted for 
non-Cornish 
constituencies) 
Plaid Cymru SNP 
1979 9.5 11.7 19.4 
1984 1.6 (Cornish 
Nationalist Party 
candidate) 
12.2 17.8 
1989 3.0 12.9 25.6 
1994 2.1 17.1 32.6 
1999 no candidate 29.6 27.2 
Source: as Table 1 
 
Logically, ethnoregional identities are more likely to be expressed in regional 
elections (Hamann 1999) and the elections to the devolved Scottish Parliament and 
Welsh Assembly would seem to bear this out. Cornwall has no similar democratically 
elected body, but there is a local government body, Cornwall County Council, that 
matches its territory. MK candidates have appeared at this level since 1967, although 
the party has never been able to contest more than a quarter of the available seats. 
However, the number of candidates does reflect the widely observed two ‘waves’ of 
ethnoregionalist electoral activity (Letamendia 1997), declining in the late 1980s and 
re-emerging during the 1990s. In terms of votes won, the party does considerably 
better at this level, succeeding in electing one councillor in each election from 1985 to 
1997. But local government elections in Cornwall are not fully party-politicised. The 
mean vote of MK candidates is therefore inflated by those instances where it is not 
 6
opposed by Labour or the Liberal Democrats. If we ignore straight fights with 
Conservatives or Independents and isolate those contests with at least two opponents 
the MK vote is as shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Number of MK candidates and mean percentage vote in contests with at least 
three candidates, Cornwall County Council elections 
 candidates Mean vote in contests with 
three or more candidates (N) 
1977 7 14.8 (5) 
1981 14 (including 5 CNP)   13.8 (12) 
1985 5 (including 2 CNP) 10.5 (3) 
1989 3 12.7 (2) 
1993 7   8.5 (4) 
1997 13   10.1 (11) 
2001 21   12.1 (21) 
 
 
At this level there is clearly more support. Although, in a first past the post system, 
this is insufficient to gain councillors, under a proportional voting system MK would 
be consistently represented at the local government level. Overall therefore, when 
compared with the SNP or Plaid Cymru, MK has performed very poorly in the 
electoral arena, failing to achieve a breakthrough. Nevertheless, it has maintained a 
sustained though not comprehensive, presence at elections at all levels and its voting 
support is comparable with most fourth party interventions in England. While 
admitting it is ‘a long way from being the equivalent of the SNP or Plaid Cymru’, 
Henig and Baston (2002: 50) conclude that ‘it is a serious and committed presence on 
the Cornish scene with potential for growth’. 
 
Moreover, another comparison can be made. Breton nationalism has received 
considerably more academic attention than that of Cornwall. In the 1970s accounts 
tended to treat Breton nationalism as if it were equivalent to that of Scotland, Wales, 
the Basque Country or Catalonia (Reece 1977). This gave way in the 1980s to a more 
critical perspective (Keating 1985; Rogers 1990). Nevertheless, overly simplistic 
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summaries of Breton nationalism can still be encountered, for example in the 
assertion of ‘growing levels of popular support for nationalism in Brittany, Quebec, 
Scotland and Wales, among other regions, from the 1960s onwards’ (Thompson and 
Fevre 2001: 310). In electoral terms at least this overestimates the support received by 
Breton nationalism. 
 
In 1963 the Union Democratique Bretonne (UDB) was formed and quickly became 
the principal Breton ethnoregionalist political organisation, gaining municipal 
councillors in 1977 as part of a Union of the Left. At the same time it began to contest 
elections to the French Legislative Assembly. Although a more explicitly socialist 
party from its inception, the UDB’s move into electoral politics closely paralleled 
MK. Indeed, the more radical wing of MK had considerable contact with the UDB in 
the later 1970s and early 1980s. In the 1980s, however, the UDB found it increasingly 
difficult to carve out a space for itself as its former Socialist Party allies took over the 
reins of government.  The UDB discovered that it was unable to influence government 
policy and yet also incapable of emerging as a credible political force. Its membership 
fell from over 2,000 at its height in the late 1970s to 800 by 1983 (Rogers 1990). Like 
MK, the 1980s was a difficult decade for the UDB and strategy shifted as the party 
made overtures to ecologists, cultural activists and others. While the UDB faced more 
rivals as the Breton movement began to fragment, like MK it survived the 1980s and 
continues to be the most active electoral component of the Breton ethnoregionalist 
movement. 
 
If we compare the votes gained at state-wide elections by the UDB with those of MK 
a very similar picture emerges. 
 
Table 4: Mean votes and number of candidates at parliamentary elections 
Year MK Year UDB and allies 
1970 2.0 (1)   
1974 (Feb) 1.5 (1) 1973 2.2 (5) 
1974 (Oct) 0.7 (1)   
1979 2.9 (3) 1978 1.9 (17) 
1983 1.2 (2) 1981 2.2 (16) 
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1987 no candidates 1986 and 1988 no candidates 
1992 no candidates 1993 no candidates 
1997 0.8 (4) 1997 2.0 (24) 
2001 2.1 (3) 2002 1.5 (36) 
 
 
In addition, although there have been regional elections in France since 1986, so far 
the UDB and its allies have been unable to surmount the five per cent bar necessary to 
gain seats. In cantonal elections, the most directly comparable with County Council 
elections in Cornwall, 53 Breton regionalist candidates in 2001 (contesting around 40 
per cent of the available seats) won a mean 4.6 per cent of the vote, no improvement 
on the 5.6 per cent mean vote of its 34 candidates at the height of the first wave of 
ethno-regionalism in 1979 (Loughlin 1985). 
 
Such levels of electoral support are the same or lower than those achieved by MK. 
Proportions of the total vote might not, however, be the most appropriate comparative 
measure. Gordin proposes an Index of Electoral Success (IES), which compares the 
votes won by ethnoregionalist parties with the votes obtained by the leading party in 
the region. For Gordin this has the advantage of yielding ‘a comparative measure at 
the cross-national level, which is independent of the number of contenders and 
population size’ (Gordin 2001: 156). Applying this measure to recent elections in 
Cornwall, Brittany, Wales and Scotland, we see in Table 5 that both the UDB and 
MK’s IES at parliamentary level is very weak, when compared with that of Plaid 
Cymru and the SNP. At local government level, however, the IES for MK is 
considerably higher than that of the UDB. 
 
Table 5: Index of Electoral Success 
 Parliamentary elections Pmt//Assembly/ 
regjonal 
elections 
Local elections 
 1997 2001 1998/99 2001 
MK 0.02 0.05  0.32 
UDB 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.12 
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PC 0.18 0.29 0.86  
SNP 0.48 0.45 0.81  
 
 
We can now revisit Hechter and Levi’s implied question. From the perspective of 
Cornwall as a (Celtic) nation the weak performance of MK when compared with Plaid 
Cymru and the SNP reinforces the view that Cornish regional nationalism has failed. 
MK remains confined to the margins of electoral visibility, unable to achieve a total 
coverage in terms of its electoral interventions. Thus, from this perspective we need to 
explain that relative failure. However, the example of another ‘Celtic’ case study, that 
of Brittany, suggests that such failure is not limited to the Cornish ethnoregionalist 
movement. On the other hand, from a perspective of Cornwall as an (English) county, 
the very existence of Cornish ethnoregionalism should be a puzzling anomaly. Its 
persistence over the past half-century is itself a phenomenon that requires explanation, 
as no county or region of England has given rise to anything similar.   
 
 
The opportunity structure of Cornish nationalism: external determinants 
 
For De Winter and Tursan (1998) the ability of ethnoregionalist parties to mobilise 
and to succeed depends, on a series of external and internal determinants making up 
their ‘opportunity structure’. Foremost among the five proposed external determinants 
is the relative strength of the regional identity. Hearl et al (1996) have argued that the 
most important factor in explaining the success of regional nationalism is the presence 
of a widely spoken regional language. However, the relative success of the SNP and 
the Lega Nord casts doubt on this. For De Winter and Tursan (1998: 216-17) 
language is instead part of a general feeling of belonging. It is this broader level of 
regional identification that correlates with levels of voting for an ethnoregionalist 
party. In the case of MK, the most crucial determinant is often deemed to the 
resources supplied by the cultural identity. There has been a tendency to repeat the 
assertion that Cornwall is a region with a ‘rather weak sense of identity’ (Guiberneau 
2001: 17). Others go further. For Shaw (1991: 226) there is ‘no distinctive Cornish 
identity’, the ‘original’ Cornish identity having been undermined. But it is not clear 
what evidence these assertions are based on. 
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 There is a circular argument here. The weakness of the ethnoregionalist party, which 
‘oscillates around the threshold of political visibility’ (Stanyer 1997) is taken to prove 
the weakness of cultural identity. In turn, a weak ethnoregional party cannot mobilise 
the ethnoregional identity. However, the view that the weakness of Cornish 
ethnnoregionalism is a simple function of the ‘weakness’ of its identity has a number 
of problems. First, actual survey data on the strength of identity in Cornwall is 
lacking, although there are some indications that the sense of belonging to Cornwall 
as a territory is notably stronger than the norm for administrative counties in England 
(MORI 1994; MORI 2003). Second, the work on nationalism would suggest that 
identities are malleable, fluid and provisional (Thompson and Day 1999: 39). 
Identities can change and identities are made. Permanent and continuing ‘weakness’ 
can therefore never be taken for granted. Finally, the assumption that there is a simple 
link between the strength of identity and ethnoregional party support may not be so 
clear-cut. Here, the Breton comparison is instructive. As we have seen, the Breton 
ethnoregionalist movement is, in terms of its electoral support, no stronger than the 
Cornish. Yet most observers recognise a distinctive Breton identity, involving a 
‘powerful sense of attachment to a physical territory and its looks, as well as a sense 
of sharing, however, diffusely, in a way of life’ (Timm ????:119; Le Coadic 1998). As 
in Brittany, a distinctive, if subtle and diffuse sense of Cornish ‘difference’ may exist 
yet not give rise to an electorally successful ethnoregionalist party. 
 
Other external resources clearly have a part to play in the relative failure of Cornish 
nationalism. In the Cornish case the electoral system seems to be an obvious 
constraint. Unlike the SNP and Plaid Cymru, MK did not succeed in breaking through 
in the crucial decades of the 1960s and 1970s. When, during the 1980s and 1990s, the 
main parties expanded their interventions in local elections and other competitor 
parties arrived, difficulties were compounded. Yet the other three ‘external’ resources 
noted by De Winter – demonstration effects, Europeanization and critical events - 
have not acted as obvious constraints. MK’s ‘oscillations’ strongly correlate with the 
two waves of ethnoregionalist party activity. Its fortunes therefore benefit, albeit at a 
low level, from demonstration effects. Similarly the process of European integration 
provides another space for Cornish ethnoregionalism. European Objective 1 structural 
funding in 1999 resulted in the re-drawing of the European regional map and the 
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recognition of Cornwall as a Level II European statistical region. This gave Cornwall 
more visibility within Europe. From another institutional direction, the existence of 
European Minority Rights and Minority Language Charters has opened up a new 
arena for pressure group activity, focusing on the Council of Europe. In contrast, in 
1999 the adoption of proportional representation in very large constituencies for Euro-
elections in the UK closed down that particular electoral space. Finally, critical events 
remain an unpredictable resource, although they help to explain the timing of the 
appearance of Cornish regional nationalism. In the mid-1960s proposals for large-
scale population transfers of Londoners to ‘overspill’ estates in Cornwall triggered a 
growth in MK’s membership and its subsequent leap into electoral politics. 
 
Other, external constraints may be identified if we look to what Gordin (2001) calls 
‘additional context factors’. First, Giordiano (2001) has called attention to the link 
between economically buoyant regions and ‘relatively strong regionalist political 
parties’, using Flanders, Catalonia and northern Italy to illustrate his point. As 
Cornwall’s qualification for EU Objective 1 grant aid implies, its economy has been 
anything but buoyant, marked by under-unemployment and the lowest wages 
anywhere in the UK. Yet, the Cornish paradox is that, in contrast to other ‘depressed’ 
areas, in-migration to Cornwall fuelled by ‘quality of life’ aspirations and a mass 
tourist industry and facilitated by the house price differential between Cornwall and 
the south east of England, has run at relatively high levels since the early 1960s. High 
levels of in-migration, though credited with triggering a revival of ‘Cornishness’ as 
people looked to what distinguished them in a period of rapid social change, have also 
changed the demographic profile of Cornwall. By 2001 probably only around a half of 
Cornish residents had been born or brought up in Cornwall, a situation similar to the 
Isle of Man, where it has been claimed that immigration in the 1980s weakened Manx 
cultural traditions and was a factor in a muted nationalist response (Prentice 1990). 
 
However, political factors may be more relevant for explaining the political weakness 
of Cornish ethnoregionalism. In the 1980s Studlar and McAllister (1988) asked 
whether Liberal/Alliance and nationalist voters were part of a general Britain-wide 
protest, on the basis that Scots and Welsh nationalist voters resembled those for the 
Alliance. Other studies have noted the negative correlation of SNP and Liberal 
Democrat voting support and the strong protest element in the SNP vote in the 1970s, 
 12
a protest vote that, in some circumstances, could also find a home with the Liberal 
Democrats (Lutz 1990; Levy 1995). Arguing back to Cornwall from this evidence a 
key factor constraining the growth of MK has been the presence of the Liberal 
Democrats. Potential protest voters in Cornwall have always had the credible option 
of the Liberals, even in the 1970s the clear alternative to the Conservatives in three of 
the five Cornish constituencies. In the later 1960s, when MK still allowed dual 
membership with other parties, Liberal MPs and other Liberal activists were 
prominent members. Indeed, in 1968 Liberal Constituency Associations were reported 
to be ‘investigating the political and economic implications of independence’ and 
considering a bill demanding independence for Cornwall (Tregidga 2000). Liberal 
Democrats in Cornwall continued to play a local card in the 1980s and 1990s, 
appealing to a ‘fair deal for Cornwall’ in their electoral rhetoric. The anti-
metropolitanism of the Liberal Democrats both obscured the distinction between it 
and MK and attracted those voters who wanted a credible chance of electing an MP. It 
also means that in Cornwall MK has always found it difficult to retain activists 
ambitious for office. The Liberal Democrats offer a potential home for such people, 
the most prominent recent example being Andrew George, MP for St.Ives. 
Ethnoregionalist party relationships with ‘mainstream’ parties also explain the 
difficulties of the UDB in Brittany in the 1980s. Here, a regionalist orientated 
Socialist Party played a role similar to that of the Liberal Democrats in Cornwall, 
siphoning off potential nationalist voters and UDB activists (Keating 1985). 
 
 
Internal determinants 
 
External opportunities require internal resources in order to be translated from 
potential facilitating factors to agents of success. Regional elites and ethnoregional 
leaders wed symbols of group solidarity to issues of redistributive justice or self-
determination (O’Sullivan See 1986: 32). Here, the internal resources of ethno-
regionalism become more crucial. These include leadership resources, party 
organisation, voters, strategy and media and links to broader regional networks. 
Leadership resources are viewed as a crucial factor; De Winter notes the role of 
charismatic personalities such as Jorde Pujol in Catalonia, Umberto Bossi in Northern 
Italy and Gwynfor Evans in Wales, who played a crucial role on sustaining and 
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publicising their parties (De Winter and Tursan 1998: 222). MK has produced no 
leader of the same stature. Significantly, while the leadership of the SNP has included 
a number of private sector professionals (Lynch 2002: 4), this group has not been 
present in MK. In contrast four of the eight MK leaders since the mid-1960s have 
been teachers and lecturers, and the core activists are more likely to come from lower 
levels of public sector employment.  
 
The second internal determinant is the strength of party organisation. De Winter 
(1998: 226) observes that the relationship between electoral success and ethnoregional 
party membership is actually very weak but that many such parties are vulnerable to 
factionalism. The ability of the party organisation to contain such factionalism thus 
becomes an important resource. MK’s party organisation has never been able to 
support a persistent organisational presence in all Cornwall’s urban areas or raise the 
money necessary either to fight large-scale election campaigns or to employ full-time 
organisers. The result is a shifting geography of activity, as electoral interventions and 
branch presence fluctuates depending on the variable energy of voluntary activists. In 
this respect MK remains stuck at an organisational level reminiscent of the SNP in the 
1950s (Lynch 2002: 64-91). Nevertheless, MK has avoided a great deal of damaging 
factionalism. 
 
In Catalonia Moreno et al (1998) discovered that expressions of Catalan identity 
positively correlate with higher social class and De Winter proposes that a further 
internal determinant is the potential voting support for the ethnoregionalist party. If 
the success of an ethnoregionalist party depends on the presence of younger, well 
educated voters attracted to post-materialist values, as much of the literature suggests, 
then this is one internal resource relatively less available in Cornwall. The absence of 
a university in Cornwall has led to a pattern of net out-migration of better qualified 
school-leavers. In addition, a paucity of professional jobs plus the competition 
produced by a large counter-urbanisation stream of middle aged and well qualified in-
migrants mean that it is extremely difficult for those who leave for higher education to 
obtain work in Cornwall (Perry et al 1986). 
 
Another internal resource available to ethnoregionalist parties is that of strategy and 
media. Newman (1996: 10) introduces a typology of ethnoregional ideologies, 
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depending on the socio-economic groups to whom appeal is made. In the 1960s the 
party adopted a formally ‘classless-inclusive approach’, appealing simultaneously to 
all social groups. However, in practice this has often looked more like a ‘selective-
protective’ ideology, laying greater emphasis on the interests of groups suffering most 
from modernisation, such as the declining mining and quarrying industry, fishermen 
and small farmers. MK’s electoral appeal has not been enhanced by its failure to 
engage with a ‘selective-developmental’ ideology, appealing to thriving new 
occupational sectors. But there remains a problem of transmitting the message to 
these sectors. One internal resource that MK clearly lacks is media coverage. No print 
medium matches the territory of Cornwall. The local daily press - the Western 
Morning News - is printed outside Cornwall and covers Devon and parts of Somerset 
and Dorset as well as Cornwall. Meanwhile, the weekly press fragments Cornwall 
into a series of market areas, feeding a parochialism induced by a dispersed settlement 
structure. Conversely, although there is a BBC local radio station, the all-important 
television channels are based on a geographical template that includes Cornwall 
within a much larger market.   
 
De Winter’s final internal determining factor is the ability of the regional party to link 
into broader regional networks (see also Newman 1994). Initially, MK grew out of a 
wider Cornish cultural revivalist movement. While its base in this social movement 
helped to guarantee a certain longevity, the Cornish revival remained for most of the 
twentieth century a small sub-culture within Cornwall. Its bardic trappings and Celtic 
borrowings, including a Cornish kilt, were regarded as somewhat esoteric by much of 
Cornish society, and the connection to Cornwall’s historic identity, shaped more by 
rural industrialisation associated with mining, by nonconformity and emigration, was 
always a tentative one. However, to some extent, cultural change in Cornwall since 
the 1980s has blended the icons of the Cornish revival with other practices, such as 
music and sport, thus partly integrating the revivalist sub-culture into popular culture. 
At the same time MK’s links with cultural revivalism have loosened, although it has 
not embedded itself in other regional networks. This introduces a crucial institutional 
constraint facing Cornish ethnoregionalism.  
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Institutions 
 
Lecours (2000) has called for the explicit employment of historical institutionalism in 
isolating a political opportunity structure outside the social movements under 
investigation. This, he claims, helps explain the timing and intensity of ethno-
regionalist movements, which are ‘heavily dependent upon their institutional 
environment’ (Lecours 2000: 12). Structural opportunities then combine with 
‘movement entrepreneurs’ who connect the identity with situations and events defined 
as unjust. To an extent Lecours’ approach overlaps with De Winter’s external and 
internal resources. But it opens out the political opportunity approach so that it 
becomes more sensitive to the institutional context outside the political sphere and to 
the broader role of elites in the region, and not merely those leading the 
ethnoregionalist movement. 
 
By alerting us to the context of wider institutions and elites, Lecours’ approach 
isolates important factors in the weakness of Cornish ethnoregionalism. Adopting the 
concept of ‘institutional thickness’ (Storper 1997) Giordiano has argued that ‘a 
political regionalist project can gain much greater legitimacy and importance if it is 
able to embed itself among dominant local and regional, economic and civic 
institutions’ (Giordiano, 2001). However, Cornwall since the 1960s has been subject 
to a process of de-institutionalisation, as both public and private sector institutions 
formerly organised on a Cornish territorial basis have been merged into wider 
administrative organisations based on either Devon and Cornwall or on the 
Government’s seven county planning region of the South West.  Such re-
centralisation has opened up an institutional vacuum in Cornwall. Thus, there are 
precious few Cornish institutions left in which an ethnoregionalist movement might 
embed itself. 
 
Re-centralisation and the flight of institutional headquarters and decision making 
eastwards also helps to produce a weak civil society in Cornwall. There are now very 
few non-governmental and quasi-governmental institutional bodies organised on a 
Cornish territorial basis. This contrasts starkly with Scotland, where the pervasive 
civil society generates a sense of unity and consensus (Hearn 2002). If we add the 
absence of Cornish-based media or a university we have all the ingredients for an 
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‘institutionally-thin’ region, one which lacks the resources necessary for generating 
strategic and critical debate about its economic and social direction. The absence of 
such institutions means that decision-making becomes subject to a process of 
fragmentation and competitive parochialism at the local level, whereas strategic 
direction is removed upwards to peak ‘regional’ institutions. Local elites are then 
pulled into a centralised level of decision-making and networks based on Bristol or 
Exeter, over a hundred miles distant from Cornwall.  
 
Focusing on the broader institutional and elite context Lecours’ approach has allowed 
us to pinpoint further factors constraining Cornish ethnoregionalism. However, in 
view of Cornwall’s peripheral location in wider institutional networks, we must shift 
our focus both outwards onto institutions and networks based elsewhere – but at the 
same time not lose sight of the cultural underpinnings of Cornish identity.  
 
 
Categorizing Cornwall 
 
Ethnic identities are categorized as the result of an ongoing interaction between 
internal and external definitions (Jenkins 1994). In terms of the latter, wider structures 
of governance, of power and authority relations are crucial. Here, broadening out 
Lecours’ historical institutionalist approach to encompass the institutions of the new 
regionalisation in the South West, we can identify a wider context that constrains 
Cornwall’s ethnoregionalist movement. Institutions shape individual goals and 
preferences. The construction of a bank of institutions based on a supra-Cornish 
territorial scale structures both career paths and the perceived boundaries of the 
possible for elite groups in Cornwall. The growth of such formal institutions also lock 
into place ‘path-dependencies’ as they act as entrepreneurs for a certain definition of 
regionalism. By defining one scale as ‘the region’, other lower scales of activity are, 
perforce, ‘local’, with all the connotations of that term. Thus institutions are more 
than constraining structures; they are ‘normative vessels’, carrying understandings 
and establishing ways of doing things, and providing ‘cognitive scripts, categories and 
models’ (Hall and Taylor 1996: 948).  
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The re-centralised institutions of the South West region therefore have considerable 
implications for the choices and constraints that structure the Cornish ethnoregionalist 
movement. Most important, they reinforce and reproduce a categorization of Cornwall 
as ‘local’, one that leaves little space for an ethnoregionalist movement. The 
consequent difficulties in bringing this inconvenient periphery to public attention 
were neatly illustrated in the central government response to the Cornish 
Constitutional Convention, a campaign that emerged in 2000 to demand an assembly 
for Cornwall in the process of English regionalization (Sandford 2002). Despite 
collecting 50,000 signatures in support of an assembly and encouraging more people 
from Cornwall to respond to government consultation exercises than did from all 
other regions combined (Western Morning News 17 October 2002) this campaign was 
studiously ignored by the UK Government’s White Paper on Regional Government 
(DTLR/Cabinet Office 2002). Moreover, the Government’s regional template acts to 
reinforce the hybridity of local culture in Cornwall, confirming an ambiguous context 
for Cornish nationalism.  
 
People do not have a fixed, unshakeable identity. Instead, dual identities are 
widespread. For example, in Spain a sense of self-ascribed local or ethno-territorial 
identity co-exists with state identities produced by political integration and state-
building to produce a ‘compound nationality’ (Moreno et al 1998). Territorial 
identities ‘nest’ along a hierarchy of scales and the salience of any one scale will vary 
depending on the social context (Herb and Kaplan 1999). Such ‘nesting’ in Cornwall 
is already perhaps more complex than elsewhere, even without the complication of a 
South West region. In Cornwall there is the added scale of Englishness. Just as 
Englishness has been expressed through Britishness (Wellings 2002), so has 
Cornishness sometimes nested within Englishness. The very obviousness of 
Englishness (Colls 2002: 2-3) also makes it an enigma (Kumar 2003: ix). As a 
consequence ideas of Englishness in Cornwall – whether taken for granted in the 
Cornwall as (English) county paradigm or hastily passed over in the Cornwall as 
(Celtic) nation paradigm - have been even less researched than ideas of Cornishness. 
Nevertheless, English imaginations are reproduced both by Cornwall’s contemporary 
administrative and institutional status and by the presence of large number of 
migrants, mainly from the south east of England, who bring their national imaginings 
with them. 
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 In France and Spain, the greatest regionalist success has been associated with 
societies experiencing the most disruption and disintegration (Loughlin 1985; 
Blinkhorn 1994). Brown (2000: 77) also argues that nationalism is generated by 
‘diffuse feelings of insecurity and uncertainty’. But in Cornwall the ethnoregionalist 
movement has competition when attempting to tap such uncertainty. An undertow of 
English nationalism provides a potential alternative in the shape of the neo-populist 
right, driven by feelings of insecurity which, in the UK, manifest themselves in such 
things as fear of asylum seekers, racism, support for fox hunting and anti-
Europeanism. It may be no coincidence that the Referendum Party in 1997 achieved 
some of its highest votes in Cornwall, while the United Kingdom Independence Party 
and pro-hunting campaigns alike continue to receive the support of small but 
vociferous minorities. 
 
However, things are not quite as clear-cut as this suggests. The boundary between 
Cornishness and Englishness is porous, with Englishness structuring Cornishness but 
Cornishness also influencing Englishness. Just as in Brittany, the black and white 
Breton flag – the Gwenn ha Du – is carried on virtually all demonstrations and public 
rituals (Gemie 2001), it may be significant that in Cornwall the St.Piran’s flag now 
appears a de rigueur accessory at demonstrations of all kinds. These extend from 
those against war in Iraq through local campaigns to prevent hospital closures to 
marches in London organised by the Countryside Alliance. Cornish flags, only a 
decade or so ago confined almost solely to demonstrations in and around the Cornish 
ethnoregionalist movement, are now in common use and have even been approved as 
the official logo for Cornish tourist sites. Such recent ‘banal flagging’ (Billig 1995) 
might suggest that this explicitly Cornish symbol, formerly confined to the Cornish 
cultural revival, is becoming more embedded in local culture. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This article has argued that the marginal work on Cornwall has suffered from over-
rigid categorization, failing to perceive the details of the Cornish case and 
succumbing to easy stereotypes. Instead, the comparative history of Cornish 
 19
nationalism reveals a paradox – a sustained ethnoregionalist movement that is unable 
to achieve electoral or policy success. How far has an opportunity structure approach 
helped to unlock this paradox? The timing, the claims and the low level of 
institutionalisation of Cornish political nationalism in the wider political system can 
all be partly understood by a comparative analysis of its external and internal 
resources available to it. In particular, the electoral system plus the internal factors of 
strength of party organisation, media coverage and voters have not allowed MK to 
connect a sense of difference to wider grievances based on either territory or ethnicity. 
As an ‘ethnic entrepreneur’ it has not succeeded and in consequence has become 
marooned in an electoral void, able to maintain itself in existence but unable to 
sustain a credible competitive challenge to the three mainstream political parties. 
 
However, analysis needs to re-focus on a broader scale in order to explain both why 
the Cornish identity does not unproblematically translate into support for regional 
nationalism and why the internal resources available to it are comparatively limited. 
Here, a historical institutionalist approach that moves beyond the territory of Cornwall 
to the constraints posed by attitudes of the central state, Cornwall’s institutionalisation 
into a  wider government region and the consequent poverty of local civil society is 
essential in order to take us further. This provides another crucial limiting factor 
constraining Cornish nationalism through structuring ways of imagining Cornish 
identity which in this discourse becomes a local as opposed to a regional (or national) 
identity. By expanding our focus not just towards a different scale but away from the 
political and onto social and cultural terrains, we discover additional constraints on 
Cornish nationalism. Notably, Cornwall’s administrative history as part of England 
and the large-scale demographic changes of recent generations combine to produce an 
imagining of Englishness within Cornwall. On an individual level this might co-exist 
with identities of Cornishness. But, at certain times in certain contexts, it can act as a 
competitive imagining, providing another pole of action for resentments and 
insecurities. 
 
It is not, therefore, some absolute ‘weakness’ of cultural identity that underlies MK’s 
limited electoral success but the way that identity is imagined and the context of that 
imagination. Indeed, the argument here has been that there is no simple or automatic 
link between strength of identity and political ethnoregionalism. The more crucial 
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factor in Cornwall is the way the territorial identity competes with other national 
identities and the ambiguous political meanings it carries for people. To investigate 
this further requires a lower level of analysis, focusing on the micro-sociology of the 
Cornish identity and the way it is utilised in routine social practices, with comparative 
analysis to show why, in some places and in some contexts, ethnoregional identities 
are transformed into successful political movements and in other places they are not. 
The Breton case, where Rogers (1996: 551) concludes that ‘ethnic consciousness may 
not always be displayed through allegiance to highly visible nationalist organisations 
but by means of other indicators … [participants] may have no specific political 
project at all’ suggests that Cornish ethnoregionalism is not unique. 
 
Cultural hybridity goes a considerable way to explain the relative weakness of 
Cornish nationalism and its marginal institutionalisation in the political system. 
However, it does not explain the fact of its existence in the first place nor its 
persistence in the face of considerable structural constraints. The cultural resources 
bequeathed to contemporary Cornwall by its ‘Celtic’ history and language can clearly 
still resonate sufficiently powerfully to propel people into supporting and working for 
Cornish ethnoregional movements. This might suggest there is a resilient core to the 
Cornish identity that imagines itself as distinctive enough to demand forms of 
separate treatment, whether political or cultural, from the central state. Active at a 
relatively low degree when compared with Scotland or Wales, this core nevertheless 
sustains the Cornish ethnoregionalist movement at a certain level of activity. 
 
There is no reason to assume that this movement will disappear, having struggled to 
carve out a small, but distinct, niche for itself. But will it change to reflect what some 
observers see as a growing multiplicity of identities? Cornish ethnoregionalism may 
be at a turning point. As in the Isle of Man, there seems to be a process of cultural 
renewal under way as ‘creative reselection’ produces a new set of symbols around 
which ‘cultural performances’ can take place (Hale 2002). Ethnicity is open to 
negotiation and Cornishness may be becoming more of ‘an idea, a set of values, a way 
of relating to place and to each other’ than a fixed, essentialist ethnic identification 
(Lewis 2002). It remains to be seen whether the hints of creative cultural re-selection 
can manufacture a more inclusive nationalism able to appeal to both insiders and 
incomers. 
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 The possibility that Cornwall may accompany the Isle of Man or Brittany into a ‘post-
ethnic’ future (Timm ????) raises questions about the salience of ethnicity in a future 
Cornwall. Echoes of this may be heard in attempts by the Cornish Constitutional 
Convention to build a feeling of belonging to Cornwall as a ‘region’, subverting the 
official discourse of regionalism in England. Simultaneously, others are re-
emphasising Cornish ethnicity, in the process attempting to draw firmer historical 
boundaries between ‘Cornwall’ and ‘England’ (Angarrack 2002). Such contrasting 
initiatives reinforce the impression of a Cornish hybridity, one in the process of 
constant change and renegotiation. However, if a sense of cultural renewal is to be 
attached to projects of civic autonomy then the current Cornish institutional vacuum 
provides perhaps the most critical constraint for Cornish ethnoregionalism. In the 
absence of an institutional context feelings of insecurity may overwhelm cultural 
renewal and produce a permanently marginalized illiberal nationalism in Cornwall, 
and one, moreover, that comes in two varieties, Cornish and English. 
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